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GUNS & DRUGS: THE
CIA'S ADMISSIONS (AND SOME OF WHAT THEY DIDN'T ADMIT)
By Ed Rippy 4/4/02
Note: Because some passages from the report contain text inserted by
the CIA in brackets ([]), text inserted by the author (for clarity) is
in braces ({}) throughout.
In 1996 Gary Webb, then an investigative reporter for the San Jose
Mercury News, published an expose of the CIA's protection of cocaine
(and crack) smuggling into South Central Los Angeles. It was a
bombshell, and after an initial silence provoked a relentless attack
from the rest of the 'establishment' media. Ultimately the Merc backed
away from the story and transferred Webb -- a top-flight investigator
-- to a backwater, assigning him an endless stream of stories like the
death of a police horse and computer classes in summer school. Webb
quit.1
But the story didn't die. The Merc had put most of the documentary
evidence on its Website, and it was too much to ignore. The CIA had to
respond.
It did so with an Inspector General's (IG) report (classified, of
course). But it also released an unclassified version, which, though
tedious, reveals much to the persistent reader. Let's take a look.
The first issue is, what was the Agency legally required to report? US
law requires that the CIA report "any information, allegations, or
complaints" of criminal activity by "Government officers and
employees." The White House, DOJ and CIA fine-tuned the meaning of this
law in a series of (Presidential) Executive Orders (EOs) and Memoranda
of Understanding (MOUs), culminating in a 1981 EO (#12333) and a 1982
MOU between Attorney Gen'l (AG) Smith and Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) Casey. The EO defined "employee" as "a person
employed by, assigned to or acting for an agency within the
Intelligence Community." The MOU narrowed this definition to "a staff
employee or contract employee of the Agency" -- omitting those who were
"acting for" it as long as they weren't staff or (overt) contractors.
The report adds, "The effect of this omission was to move persons
'acting for,' but not employed by or assigned to, CIA from the
'employee' to the 'non-employee' category for crimes reporting
purposes." Adolfo Chamorro, logistics chief of one of the Contra
groups, is a good example. (There was a list of specific crimes by such
people which the CIA did have to report, but it did not include drug
smuggling). Regarding these non-employees, the MOU continued:
"{Existing US law} provides that 'when requested by the Attorney
General, it shall be the duty of any agency or instrumentality of the
Federal Government to furnish assistance to him for carrying out his
functions under [the Controlled Substances Act] . . . .' Section 1.8(b)
of Executive Order 12333 tasks the Central Intelligence Agency to
'collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of
narcotics production and trafficking.' Moreover, authorization for the
dissemination of information concerning narcotics violatons [sic] to
law enforcement agencies, including the Department of Justice, is
provided by sections 2.3(c) and (i) and 2.6(b) of the Order. In light
of these provisions, and in view of the fine cooperation the Drug
Enforcement Administration has received from CIA, no formal requirement
regarding the reporting of narcotics violations has been included in
these procedures."
First, it says the CIA has a "duty" to assist the AG "when requested"
-- but makes no request! Next, it says the EO "tasks" CIA with
unspecified narcotics intelligence gathering and dissemination (to
whom?) Finally, it states that there is "no formal requirement" to
report drug smuggling -- a loophole the Contras and their "benefactors"
flew tonnes of cocaine through for years. It was not until 1995 that
the MOU was revised so that "assets and independent contractors are
again considered 'employees' for crimes reporting purposes. Further,
narcotics violations are included among the list of 'non-employee'
crimes that must be reported to DoJ"2
What did this mean in practice? According to the report's "Executive
Summary:"
"CIA had no published regulations or policies that addressed CIA
employees' contacts with individuals or companies that were known or
suspected to have been involved in drug trafficking, unless they were
part of a counternarcotics operation or program. The Contra program was
not such an operation or program.
"CIA had no regulations or policies regarding CIA's responsibilities to
identify and pursue allegations or information indicating that
organizations or individuals were involved in drug trafficking.
"CIA had no regulations or policies that required that information be
requested from DEA, the Customs Service, or U.S. Government entities,
other than the FBI, regarding individuals or entities of whom CIA had
knowledge of drug allegations or information.
"ADCI {Acting Director of Central Intelligence} Gates' April 1987
memorandum stating that it was imperative that CIA avoid involvement
with individuals in Central America who were even suspected of
narcotics trafficking was not issued in any form that would advise
Agency employees generally of this policy."
As a result,
"CIA acted inconsistently in handling allegations or information
indicating that Contra-related organizations and individuals were
involved in drug trafficking. In some cases, CIA pursued confirmation
of allegations or information of drug allegations. In other cases, CIA
knowledge of allegations or information indicating that organizations
or individuals had been involved in drug trafficking did not deter
their use by CIA. In other cases, CIA did not act to verify drug
trafficking allegations or information even when it had the opportunity
to do so. In still other cases, CIA deemed the allegation or
information to be unsubstantiated or not credible. . . .
"CIA's actions in response to information received from law enforcement
agencies that indicated a possible drug trafficking connection by air
services companies and individual crew members were inconsistent.
Despite such information, several pilots and one mechanic continued to
be associated with their companies in support of the Contra program. .
. .
"Allegations and information indicating drug trafficking by 25
Contra-related individuals was shared in a variety of ways with other
Executive branch agencies, including law enforcement agencies as formal
intelligence reports, cables and briefings in Washington, D.C., and the
field. However, no information has been found to indicate that any U.S.
law enforcement entity or Executive branch agency was informed by CIA
of drug trafficking allegations or information concerning 11
Contra-related individuals and assets."3
Here are some examples of how the CIA handled information or
allegations of drug running by "non-employees:"
(Moises Nunez owned or managed two seafood companies in Costa Rica and
one in Miami.)
"On March 25, 1987, CIA questioned Nunez about narcotics trafficking
allegations against him. Nunez revealed that since 1985, he had engaged
in a clandestine relationship with the National Security Council (NSC).
Nunez refused to elaborate on the nature of these actions, but
indicated it was difficult to answer questions relating to his
involvement in narcotics trafficking because of the specific tasks he
had performed at the direction of the NSC. Nunez refused to identify
the NSC officials with whom he had been involved.
"Headquarters cabled in April 1987 that a decision had been made to
'debrief' Nunez regarding the revelations he had made. The next day
however, a Headquarters cable stated that 'Headquarters has decided
against . . . debriefing Nunez.' The cable offered no explanation for
the decision."4
Since the DCI sits on the NSC, CIA Headquarters certainly didn't need
to ask Nunez whether he were working for the NSC or not. Whichever the
case, Headquarters didn't want the local officers questioning his
activities, effectively endorsing his "NSC card." Oliver North, as we
recall, ran the Iran/Contra/guns/drugs racket as an NSC staffer.
Elsewhere in the report, we read about Jose Davila, a Contra leader
with many associations to known drug dealers:
"In view of Davila's associations, he was interviewed by CIA Security.
CIA Security believed his denials of involvement of drug trafficking
were highly questionable. On November 3, 1987, Headquarters advised
that {CIA Central American Task Force Chief Alan} Fiers had briefed
SSCI {Senate Select Committee on Intelligence} Senators Bradley and
Cohen and SSCI Staff members on October 14, 1987 regarding the problems
associated with Davila. Fiers reportedly had stated that the Agency had
no narcotics-related information regarding Davila other than his
unfavorable interviews with Security. According to the Headquarters
cable, it was the conclusion of the SSCI staffers that to cease contact
with an individual solely on the basis of a security interview would be
premature and ill advised.
"No information has been found to indicate that CIA took any further
action to attempt to resolve the drug trafficking issues relating to
Davila."
In short, if Davila was dealing drugs, they didn't want to know. The IG
quotes Fiers: "our druthers would be to continue to use him" -- and
they did.5
Regarding Carlos Alberto Amador, a pilot for the Contras during the
1980s, the report states:
"A June 1986 cable to Headquarters requested information concerning
Carlos Amador. According to the cable, an Embassy officer who served as
the point of contact for the regional DEA officer requested any
information concerning Amador. According to the cable, the regional DEA
representative said that Amador was suspected of being heavily involved
in narcotics smuggling. Also according to the cable, the DEA
representative had explained that:
Amador is a Nicaraguan who has a US passport, operates out of Costa
Rica, allegedly is helping the Contras, frequently flies into Ilopango
airport in San Salvador, and carries unspecified official credentials.
No information was provided as to why Amador is suspected of narcotics
trafficking. The Embassy officer said that if Amador is connected to
[CIA], [DEA] will leave him alone, but if not they intend to go after
him.
". . . An April 1986 cable responded to the April 1986 cable that had
connected Amador to probable movement of cocaine to Grand Cayman and
south Florida. The cable stated
. . . that the only thing Amador ... transported during these flights
[from Ilopango in late 1984] was military supplies. [It has been]
reported that Amador did fly into Ilopango several times during 1985 in
light twin engine aircraft on trips from [the U.S.] to either Costa
Rica or Panama. [There were suspicions that] . . . Amador was involved
with narcotics.
"The cable also stated:
would appreciate {the local CIA} Station advising [DEA] not to make any
inquiries to anyone re Hanger [sic] no. 4 at Ilopango since only
legitimate . . . . supported operations were conducted from this
facility."6
We shall read more about Hangars Four and Five in Celerino Castillo's
account. In June another cable repeated the request from the Embassy,
as well as the offer to leave Amador alone if he were "connected to
CIA."
From APPENDIX B of the report:
"According to a November 22, 1983 DO {CIA Directorate of Operations}
memorandum, OGC {CIA Office of the General Counsel} had asked for a
search of DO records for information concerning Castro {a Cuban-born,
naturalized US citizen who had served in the US army in the 1960s}. The
memorandum noted that Castro was being prosecuted in Texas for drug
trafficking, and DoJ had asked CIA about Castro's claims of affiliation
with CIA. A handwritten, unsigned, undated note filed with the DO
memorandum stated, '. . . DoJ is willing to drop [sic] if he was in
fact associated [with] Agency.'"7
Regarding someone identified only as "a third CIA independent
contractor:"
"In a January 1986 Security Officer's report, his responses to
questions about drug trafficking were less than satisfactory. A
February 28, 1996 memorandum from LA Division to the ADDO {CIA
Associate Deputy Director for Operations} suggested that he be
questioned again.
"According to a July 1995 report, he was questioned again in 1995 with
similar results.
"He was questioned for a third time in 1996 with similar results.
According to a report of the third round of questioning, the contract
employee could provide no explanation for his lack of credibility in
his answers. . .
"No information has been found to indicate any efforts by CIA to
resolve or verify the drug trafficking issues that arose in the 1986,
1995 and 1996 questioning of this contractor. The Agency decided in
March 1996 to end his employment.
"No information has been found to indicate that information relating to
this independent contractor's possible involvement in drug trafficking
was shared with other U.S. Government intelligence or law enforcement
entities or the Congress."8
For over nine years after the first, "less than satisfactory,"
interview the CIA did nothing even to find out whether their contractor
was dealing drugs. Finally it did another interview, which didn't help.
Only after a third similar interview did it fire the contractor -- long
after the Contra operation was over -- and it never investigated
further or passed on any of its leads.
Now let's look at some of the information that the CIA didn't find:
First are the reports of DEA agent Celerino Castillo. Castillo had
placed an informant at Ilopango Air Base in El Salvador. As the IG's
report explains,
"Between 1981 and the 1984 congressional funding cutoff {to the
Contras}, the Agency provided support services to the Contra program
from the El Salvadoran air base at Ilopango--located a few miles to the
east of San Salvador. Ilopango Air Base was controlled by the
Salvadoran military but was used by CIA as a storage point and staging
area for shipments of supplies to the Contras. . . .
"Following the 1984 congressional funding cutoff, supplies that
remained at Ilopango were distributed to the Contras by CIA personnel.
Thereafter, visits by CIA personnel to Ilopango occurred less
frequently. Contra personnel, however, continued to visit Ilopango in
connection with support being provided to the Contras by NHAO
{Nicaraguan Humanitarian Assistance Office} and the Private Benefactors
{unnamed people outside the US government, including many drug
smugglers, as it turned out, who aided the Contras}."
The report cites two passages from Castillo's book Powderburns:
". . . On August 15, {1986} I met with Jack McCavett , the
mild-mannered CIA station chief in El Salvador. Again, I repeated my
evidence {of drug smuggling} against the Contras. McCavett denied any
connection between the CIA and the Ilopango operation. . . .
"Three days later, McCavett called me into his office and pulled
$45,000 in cash out of his desk drawer. 'I've got money left over from
my budget I need to spend,' he said. 'Take this for your anti-narcotics
group. Go buy them some cars.' McCavett didn't mention the Contras, but
I suspected he was trying to buy me off. The CIA, to my knowledge, had
never given the DEA this kind of gift."
The second refers to Randy Kapasar, a CIA agent in Guatemala:
"He knew I was investigating the Contras. I knew he was helping them. I
expected him to deny my evidence of the Contras' narcotrafficking but
he followed Sofi's {a Bay of Pigs veteran who laundered drug money for
the Conras} reasoning: 'Cele, how do you think the Contras are gonna
make money? They've got to run dope, that's the only way we can finance
this operation.'"
However, the report also says, "Contrary to Castillo's claims, this
{unnamed CIA} officer emphatically denies that he had any knowledge of
Contra drug trafficking activities at Ilopango or elsewhere. . . . He
also denies that he ever asked Castillo to back away from any narcotics
investigation."9 It
cites several other officers who were at Ilopango at various times and
said they never noticed anything.
Powderburns gives considerably more detail:
"About this time, I {Castillo} recruited a Salvadoran who put the hard
evidence I needed on the Contras at my fingertips. Hugo Martinez worked
at Ilopango, writing flight plans for the private planes streaming in
and out of the airport's civilian side. That included my flights in and
out of the airport, and we talked frequently as my presence in El
Salvador increased."10
"Suddenly, my reports contained not only the names of traffickers, but
their destinations, flight paths, tail numbers, and the date and time
of each flight. Hundreds of flights each week delivered cocaine to the
buyers and returned with money headed for the great isthmus laundering
machine in Panama. I could have started a weekly newsletter: Ilopango
Doper. . . .
"The Contra planes flew out of hangars four and five, and Hugo could
identify their planes by the black cross painted on their tail. The CIA
owned one hangar, and the National Security Council ran the other."11
". . . Hugo had no trouble picking up incriminating information; many
times pilots told him outright they were taking cocaine to the United
States. The CIA had hired them, they boasted, and nobody could touch
them. Hugo would quietly jot down their names after they left. Most of
the time, Hugo simply poked his balding head into the planes as he made
his rounds. When he spotted the tightly wrapped kilos, the pilot's name
joined the others on his list. . . .
"When I ran Hugo's list of names through the computer, they all came
back as narcotics traffickers in DEA's files. Little wonder the Contras
used them, I thought. Nobody knew the terrain like drug pilots, and
their dive-and-dump flying skills perfectly matched the job description
for covert operations."12
"I wrote a string of reports on the Contras through the end of March
{1986} with the stream of intelligence Hugo and Aparecio {another
informant} generated."13
These reports seem to be part of what the CIA just couldn't find in its
investigation. Perhaps an incident recounted in Castillo's book offers
an explanation. Castillo had arranged a cocaine purchase from a new
source (in order to arrest him). On meeting him, Castillo learned that
he was a member of the Guatemalan Congress. After stalling, he took the
case to Robert Stia, DEA attache to Guatemala:
". . . Stia called Larry Thompson, the third-ranking State Department
official at the embassy, to ask how I should proceed {the top two
officials were out of the country}. Stia returned with Thompson's
instructions: Drop the pursuit. We were not there to embarrass the
Guatemalan government, he said. We were there to help them."14
Ultimately Castillo spoke to the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Edwin
Corr. He writes. "I'll never forget Corr's response. 'It's a White
House operation, Cele. Stay away from it..'"15
According to Gary Webb in Dark Alliance, "'I certainly would not say
that he did not go away with that impression,' Corr said elliptically,
in a 1993 interview. He said he doubted using the words 'White House'
in his conversation, however."16
Castillo persisted with his investigations and arrests. One raid
uncovered a huge cache of weapons, radios, and even Jeeps at the house
of William Brasher, a well-known smuggler. When Castillo arrived,
"The room was filled with enough firepower to arm a platoon. . . . A
sniper rifle caught my eye first. It looked like a .50 caliber, with a
scope big enough to peek into a window half way across town. U.S.
military field radios sat atop cases of grenades and neatly packed C4
explosives. There was night vision equipment; M16s; helicopter helmets;
Gerber combat knives; grenade launchers; compasses."17
"Aparecio ran a check on the license plates from Brasher's Jeeps. They
came back registered to the U.S. Embassy.
"Corr. I thought back to our last conversation. It's a White House
operation. I switched on one of the confiscated radios. It was tuned to
the embassy frequency, and U.S. personnel chatted back and forth in
English. Damn, I thought, they all looked me right in the eye and
flat-out lied. . . ." (italics in original)
Determined to expose the operation, Castillo had scheduled a press
conference. But then one of the Salvadoran lieutenants he was working
with told him:
"'Col. Revelo just told me he received orders not to release the
information to the press.'
"A long minute ticked away on the wall clock as I rocked in my chair. I
felt I had been drilled in the chest with an icicle. Someone high in
the chain of command had ordered Revelo, the chief of the national
police, to cancel the press conference."18
Castillo again confronted Ambassador Corr:
"'Cele, it's a covert operation,' he said, holding his palms out."19
"'We were ordered to give them all the cooperation they needed,' Corr
said, rising from his chair. The conversation was over."20
(italics in original)
Then US officials removed the evidence:
"Two days after the raid I returned to Guatemala City to write my
report. As I copied down serial numbers, Aparecio called. 'Some people
from the embassy just walked in and claimed the radios and license
plates,' he said."21
Castillo had called in Richard Rivera, a US Customs agent in Mexico
City, to trace the weapons and identify the seller. But the US
government also quashed this inquiry:
"Before the weapons could be traced, Rivera called, distraught. Customs
suddenly decided to switch jurisdiction for Central America from Mexico
City to their Panama office. His bosses ordered Rivera to pack up his
investigations from Central America, particularly anything related to
the Iran-Contra Affair, and ship them to headquarters, marked
'Classified.' Rivera boxed his files and sent them to Washington. We
never learned what, if anything, happened to the Brasher investigation."22
In his 1990 book Deep Cover former DEA agent Mike Levine describes a
1980 cocaine bust of almost 400 kilos, a record at the time, bought
from the Roberto Suarez organization of Bolivia:
"That afternoon, in a Miami bank vault, I paid Alfredo 'Cutuche'
Gutierrez and Jose Roberto Gasser, two of the biggest drug dealers in
history, nine million dollars, after which they were both arrested.
'The biggest law-enforcement sting in history,' the media called it. .
. .
"Jose Roberto Gasser--the son of Erwin Gasser, powerful Bolivian
industrialist and right-winger--was almost immediately released from
custody by the Miami U.S. Attorney's office, without the case being
presented to a grand jury. I was beside myself; there was more than
enough evidence to indict him.
"A short time later--precisely as my South American informants
predicted--Miami federal judge Alcee Hastings reduced Alfredo
Gutierrez's bail from three to one million dollars. Gutierrez was
allowed to post his bail and walk out of jail. In spite of my furious
phone calls from Argentina begging DEA headquarters and the Miami
office to put him under surveillance, nothing was done. Within hours he
was on a plane back to Bolivia. The biggest drug sting in history was
left without any defendants. . . .
"My sting operation never could have happened without help from an
antidrug faction within the Bolivian government--a faction that
Suarez's organization had to obliterate. . . . Within weeks of the
Miami arrests, with the financing of the Suarez organization and Erwin
Gasser, and the support of our CIA, a bloody coup was begun. . . . It
ended with the Bolivian government coming under the complete control of
the Suarez organization. Bolivia soon became the principal supplier of
cocaine base to the then fledgling Colombian cartels, thereby making
themselves the main suppliers of cocaine to the United States. And it
could not have been done without the tacit help of DEA and the active,
covert help of the CIA." (A footnote adds, "A State Department diplomat
in La Paz, Bolivia, said that it was the first time in history that an
entire government had been bought by drug dealers."23
(italics in original)
In late 1987, as part of an investigation, a "CIA pilot" named Jake
flew with a DEA informant to Bolivia to inspect a cocaine distribution
center, ostensibly for a major US drug buyer. Levine interviewed him
about what he had seen:
"'I still don't believe what I saw,' he told me excitedly. 'I saw so
much that, for a while, I didn't think they were going to let me out of
there. . . .'
"'What exactly did you see?'
"'All told, we saw seven landing fields.'
"'How much coke, would you estimate?'
"Jake was thoughtful, 'I would say about five thousand kilos at each,
maybe more. . . . I've been flying these missions into Colombia for
years; this is the mother lode. . . .
'The Bolivians had a military-industrial setup that was right out of a
West Point textbook. It's unbelievable. . . . It is without a doubt,'
he said, 'the General Motors of Cocaine.'"24
Peter Dale Scott, a Professor of English at the University of
California at Berkeley, and Jonathan Marshall, economics editor at the
San Francisco Chronicle, reviewed the findings of Congressional
investigations into the Contra affair headed by John Kerry in Cocaine
Politics:
"Not until August 1987, in the midst of the Iran-Contra hearings, did
Alan Fiers, head of the CIA's Central America Task Force, admit the
problem went much deeper. 'With respect to [drug trafficking by] the
Resistance Forces,' he testified, '. . . it is not a couple of people.
It is a lot of people. . . .'"25
"On April 13, 1989, three years after its investigation began and six
months after George Bush {Sr.} was elected President of the United
States, The Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and
International Operations finally confirmed what the administration,
Congress, and much of the media had attempted to dismiss: the
Contra-drug connection was real.
"The subcommittee's 144-page report . . . supplemented the
subcommittee's four-volume hearing record with FBI and Customs Service
documents, news stories, witness depositions, and a chronology of the
investigation and attempts to interfere with it.
"The subcommittee, led by Sen. John Kerry of Massachusetts, found that
drug trafficking had pervaded the entire Contra war effort. 'There was
substantial evidence of drug smuggling through the war zones on the
part of individual Contras, Contra suppliers, Contra pilots,
mercenaries who worked with the Contras, and Contra supporters
throughout the region,' the subcommittee concluded. Far from taking
steps to combat those drug flows, 'U.S. officials involved in Central
America failed to address the drug issue for fear of jeopardizing the
war efforts against Nicaragua,' the investigation showed."26
Central American cocaine trafficking in the 1980s is unique in that the
CIA admits in an official report that it overlooked drug running by its
proxy army and "benefactors" of that army, and that the DEA offered not
to interfere with them. It makes a well-documented case study, but it
is far from the whole story of the CIA and drugs. In The Politics of
Heroin, Alfred W. McCoy, Professor of Southeast Asian history at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison, gives a synopsis of CIA support of the
heroin trade since World War II:
"At the end of World War II, the possibility existed that heroin
addiction might decline and eventually disappear as a major social
problem in the United States. Heroin supplies were small, international
criminal syndicates were in disarray, and the American addict
population had declined to a level where treatment was finally
possible. Within a decade, however, the illicit heroin industry had
revived. By the early 1950s the global drug syndicates were again
operating, Southeast Asia's poppy fields were expanding, and heroin
refineries were again multiplying in both Marseille and Hong Kong. Many
of the reasons for the revival of the illicit narcotics trade lie with
the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and its covert action arm.
". . . From 1948 to 1950, the CIA allied itself with the Corsican
underworld in its struggle against the French Communist Party for
control over the strategic Mediterranean port of Marseille. With CIA
support, the Corsicans overcame their rival and for the next quarter
century used their control over the Marseille waterfront to dominate
the export of heroin to the U.S. market.
"Simultaneously in Southeast Asia, The CIA ran a series of covert
warfare operations along the China border that were instrumental in the
creation of the Golden Triangle {Burma, Laos, and Thailand} heroin
complex. In 1951, the Agency supported the formation of a Nationalist
Chinese army for a covert invasion of southwestern China. When the
invasion attempts failed in 1951-1952, the CIA installed Nationalist
troops along the Burma-China border as a tripwire for an anticipated
Communist Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. Over the next decade, the
Nationalist Army transformed Burma's Shan states into the world's
largest opium producer.
"Applying the same tactics in Laos from 1960 to 1975, the CIA created a
secret army of 30,000 Hmong tribesmen to battle Laotian Communists near
the border with North Vietnam. Since the Hmong's main cash crop was
opium, the CIA adopted a complicitous posture toward the traffic,
allowing the Hmong commander, General Vang Pao, to use the CIA's Air
America {a "proprietary" airline} to collect opium from his scattered
highland villages. In late 1969, the CIA's various covert action
clients opened a network of heroin laboratories in the Golden Triangle.
In their first years of operation, these laboratories exported
high-grade No. 4 {i.e., fully processed} heroin to U.S. troops fighting
in Vietnam. After their withdrawal, the Golden Triangle laboratories
exported directly to the United States, capturing one-third of the
American heroin market.
"During the mid-1970s, the temporary success of some DEA operations in
Turkey, Thailand, and Mexico cut the heroin flow into the United
States, reducing the number of American addicts by more than half, from
an estimated 500,000 to 200,000. In 1979, however, the CIA covert
warfare operation in Afghanistan provided the support for a major
expansion of the southern Asian drug trade. To support the Afghan
resistance against the Soviet occupation, the CIA, working through
Pakistan's intelligence, allied with Afghan guerrillas, notably
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who used the agency's arms, logistics, and support
to become the region's largest drug lord. Within a year, a surge of
southern Asian heroin had captured more than 60 percent of the American
market, breaking the long drug drought and raising the addict
population to its previous peak.
"From 1934 to 1970, the slow of League {of Nations} drug diplomacy had
forced a gradual reduction in global opium production from 7,600 tons
to only 1,000. In the following twenty years, however, the failure of
the DEA's suppression efforts combined with CIA complicity in global
traffic allowed world opium production to multiply fourfold to 4,200
tons by 1989. Significantly, some 3,000 tons, or 73 percent of the 1989
total, came from Southeast Asia, where the CIA had worked with the
region's drug lords for twenty-four years. Most of the balance comes
from southern Asian opium hills and heroin laboratories controlled by
the CIA's Afghan guerrilla clients."27
References:
(1) Gary Webb. Dark Alliance. New York: Seven Stories Press, 1998.
(2) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/findings.html#1
(3) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/intro.html
(4) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/south.html#20
(5) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/south.html#15
(6) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/south.html#18
(7) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/append.html#2
(8) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/other.html#5
(9) http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/cocaine/pilots.html
(10) Celerino Castillo. Powderburns. Buffalo, NY: Mosaic Press, 1994;
p. 137
(11) ibid., p. 138
(12) ibid., p. 139
(13) ibid., p. 140
(14) ibid., p. 159
(15) ibid., p. 160
(16) Webb, op. cit., p. 257
(17) Castillo, op. cit., p. 163
(18) ibid., p. 165
(19) ibid., p. 166
(20) ibid., p. 167
(21) ibid., p. 168
(22) ibid., p. 181
(23) Michael Levine. Deep Cover. New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell
Publishing Group, Inc., 1990, pp. 103f
(24) ibid., p. 99
(25) Peter Dale Scott and Jonathan Marshall. Cocaine Politics.
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991 pp. 8f
(26) ibid., pp. 9f
(27) Alfred W. McCoy. The Politics of Heroin. Brooklyn: Lawrence Hill
Books, 1991, pp. 18f.
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